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This Article is a follow-up to one published in 1987,' which attempted
to illustrate the proper Texas choice of law analysis under the then-recently-
adopted "most significant relationship test ' 2  The prior Article was
intended for Texas judges, and considered only what ought to occur in a
Texas state or federal court. This successor Article is for Texas practitioners,
but goes beyond the Texas courtroom. It focuses on the choice of law
process in Texas state and federal courts, but is broad enough to acquaint
1. James P. George, Clwice of Law Outline for Texas Courts, 18 TEx. TECH L REv. 785 (1987).
2. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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the reader with choice of law in all courts in the United States, and to some
extent, courts outside the United States. It is directed to litigators, but
should also be useful to transactional attorneys facing choice of law
decisions.
Two premises are essential to understanding choice of law analysis:
Forum law controls choice of law.3  This premise has three implica-
tions. First, the initial task in choice of law analysis is to identify the
forum, then to identify the forum's pertinent choice of law rules. If the
lawsuit has not yet been filed, the attorney must analyze choice of law as
to potential forums, that is, those forums with personal and subject matter
jurisdiction. Second, in transactional matters, attorneys should give any
potential forums' choice of law rules the same consideration as personal
jurisdiction and substantive law, taking care to verify that the intended
applicable law will not be undone by contrary public policy or law (either
substantive law or choice of law rules).4 Thus, do not use renvoi5 unless
the forum's choice of law rules require it.
In the United States, choice of law rules have three sources, generally
in the following priority: First, specific choice of law statutes, unless the
forum allows the statutory choice of law to be superseded by a contractual
choice of law;6 second, contractual choice of law agreements, if the forum
allows them; 7 third, general choice of law rules usually governed by forum
common law, such as the most significant relationship test used in Texas
courts. 8
These three choice of law sources are subject to preemption by
constitutional rules9 and potentially by international law rules,' ° both of
which are part of forum law.
3. That forum law controls choice of law may seem obvious, but many lawyers view choice of
law problems as being governed by ill-defined principles emanating from both within and without the
forum, or without reference to any forum. This may be caused by the problematic area of renvoi, see
infra Part VI.C, or by the fact that as much of the operating theory of choice of law comes from scholars
as from courts and legislatures. Whatever the reason for the confusion, choice of law can be more easily
understood by focusing on the forum. If forum law is defined as including local cases and statutes,
along with preemptive federal, and to some extent, international rules, then choice of law starts and stops
with forum law. Nothing will occur in the choice of law process that is not dictated by forum law.
4. Attorneys use both fonum selection clauses and choice of law clauses to promote enforcement
of the contract. But in selecting a given state as providing the forum and the applicable law, parties may
fail to consider the effect of the chosen forum's choice of law rules and public policy on the validity of
their contractual choice. Even more problematic is the situation in which a contracting party sues in
other than the designated forum, because the pasties' choice may be even more susceptible to attack.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1988); see also infra Part VI.C.
(discussing renvoi).
6. See infra APPENDIX A for examples of statutory choice of law rules.
7. See ifra Part llI.A.
8. See infra Pan IV.B.I.
9. See infra Part IV.B.2.
10. See infra Part IX.
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Readers should note that this discussion focuses on "horizontal" choice
of law (choices between geographically distinct jurisdictions), and not on
"vertical" choice of law (choices between overlapping jurisdictions, such
as federal-state conflicts under the Erie Doctrine)."
II. DEFINITIONS
State means a territorial unit with a distinct general body of law. It
includes both states of the United States and foreign states. In this Article,
other states in the United States are denoted by a capitalized "States."
Non-capitalized "states" refers generically to all such territorial units,
domestic and foreign, although the terms "foreign countries" and "nation-
states" are sometimes used for clarity.
Forum or forum state means the state in which the lawsuit is filed. This
Article uses "forums" as the plural, instead of the Latin "fora."
Local law is the substantive law of the chosen state. The whole law of
a state is its local law plus its choice of law rules. The forum's choice of
law rule - which is always controlling - will usually point only to the
local law of the chosen state. In a few special cases the forum's choice of
law rule will point to the "whole law" of the chosen state, meaning that the
chosen state's choice of law rule is applied. This process is called renvoi.
Foreign law means any law other than Texas law or United States
federal law. Foreign law includes States' laws and other foreign countries'
laws.
The foreign terms d~pegage and renvoi are italicized only in their first
usage in the text, and are defined both in their first usage and in the
Glossary at Appendix B.
This Article draws heavily from two Restatements, which are cited as
follows: Restatement (Second) refers to the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws;' 2 Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations refers to the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.3
III. TRIGGERING THE CHOICE OF LAW INQUIRY
Choice of law issues are possible any time a lawsuit has a foreign
element such as a nonresident party or an event outside the forum. The
issue arises in one of three ways: (1) a prior choice of law agreement by
11. For a brief discussion of vertical conflicts, see infra Par VII, and infra notes 85-91 and
accompanying text.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS (1988).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986)
[hereinafter "RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS"].
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litigants; (2) a pleading for the application of foreign law; or (3) on the
court's own discretionary motion.
A. Choice of Law Agreement by the Litigants
Most American courts will enforce a contractual choice of law clause if
it meets all four of the following criteria:
1. it is a valid agreement with an effective choice of law clause; 4
2. it is applicable to the lawsuit under the terms of the contract;
3. it is reasonably related to the lawsuit (i.e., the chosen law is from
a state to which the parties or the contract, or both, are connected);16
and,
4. it is not in violation of the public policy of the forum or other
interested state.1
7
14. That is. have the parties made an effective choice of law agreement? Look for a prima facie
agreement only. If there is any justiciable question as to the agreement's validity, it must be resolved
by applying the parties' chosen law, unless that choice was made in order to evade important forum
policy as to contract validity, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
(1988) and comments following (discussing public policy and the "reasonable basis" requirement), or
unless there is some other reason to deny the parties' choice. Note that although most choice of law
agreements are express, a clearly implied choice of law should also be honored. E.g., Pritchard v.
Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137-41 (1882). For further discussion, see George, supra note 1, at 789 nn.8-9.
15. The choice of law agreement's applicability may be based on the lawsuit being one of the
following:
a. An action arising on the agreement in which the choice of law clause appears;
b. An action contemplated by the agreement in which the choice of law clause appears.
See Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. 1968) (holding that
a contract's effect is determined by the law the parties intended to control). If neither of the above apply
and if no other valid basis exists for applying the parties' choice of law agreement, then the court should
disregard the agreement and apply forum law or, if requested by a litigant, a more appropriate foreign
law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 188 (1988) ("Law Governing in the
Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties").
16. Section 187(2)(a) requires a "substantial relationship" between the chosen state and the
parties or the transaction. Case law, however, requires the lower "reasonable relation" standard. Note
that § 1.105 of the Uniform Commercial Code uses "reasonable relation" as a basis for parties' choice
of law in a U.C.C. contract. See George, supra note 1, at 789 nn. 12-14, 17, 18; see also EUGENE F.
SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICr OF LAwS 669-75 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the requirement of a
"substantial relationship"). In 1993, the Texas Legislature enacted TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
35.5 1(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994), permitting parties to certain transactions to select the law of ajurisdiction
lacking a reasonable relation.
17. Public policy of the forum: If the parties' choice of law agreement is valid and applicable
to the action, and their chosen law has legislative jurisdiction, it should be applied unless its application
would violate the forum's public policy. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979)
(citing Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 427-28 (Tex. 1967)). Public policy concerns must be
fundamental and strongly held; mere variance between the foreign law and forum law is not enough to
deny the foreign law's application. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 680-81 (Tex. 1990),
cert. denied. 498 U.S. 1048 (1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 cmt. g
(1988). The Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause encourages application of other States' laws
where no forum policy is infringed upon. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, all but the strongest forum policies must give way to the full faith and
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The Supreme Court of Texas has adopted Restatement (Second) section
187, specifically addressing contractual choice of law, 8 as well as section
188, addressing choice of law for contract disputes with no effective choice
by the parties.' 9
There can, however, be legislative restrictions. The Texas Legislature
has regulated, and in some cases restricted, contracting parties' power to
choose a governing law. For example, a limited class of contracts with
clauses designating the law of another state must provide conspicuous
notice.20 In 1993, the Texas Legislature enacted a new choice of law
statute permitting parties to certain contracts to choose the law of any
jurisdiction bearing a reasonable relation to the contract.2' Another Texas
choice of law statute preempts choice of law clauses in designated insurance
contracts.22 See Appendix A for brief discussions of these statutes.
credit mandate.
Public policy of other interested states: Note that § 187 of the Restatement (Second) provides that
the pertinent public policy interests include not only the forum's interests, but also those of any other
state whose law would be applied in the absence of the patties' choice of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1988). Of course, in many cases forum public policy may also deny
the application of the law otherwise selected by the forum's choice of law rule. For additional discussion
of the role of public policy in negating the parties' contractual choice of law, see, e.g., 793 S.W.2d at
681-90.
Readers should note the effect of newly enacted Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 35.51 (Vernon
Supp. 1994), which may allow a by-passing of public policy for certain contracts. See infra note 21.
18. 793 S.W.2d at 677.
19. Id. at 678.
20. TEvx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.53 (Vernon Supp. 1994). In 1993, § 35.53(a) was
amended and now provides as follows:
(a) This section applies to a contract only if:
(1) the contract is for the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition for value of
goods for the price, rental, or other consideration of $50,000 or less;
(2) any element of the execution of the contract occurred in this state and a party
to the contract is:
(A) an individual resident of this state: or
(B) an association or corporation created under the laws of this state or having
its principal place of business in this state; and
(3) Section 1,105 of this code does not apply to the contract.
Id. § 35.53(a).
Section 35.53(b) provides the standard for notice of the application of another state's law: "[Tihe
provisions must be set out conspicuously in print, type, or other form of writing that is bold-faced,
capitalized, underlined, or otherwise set out in such a manner that a reasonable person against whom the
provision may operate would notice." Id. § 35.53(b). It did not change in 1993. Also in 1993, §
35.53(c) was reworded and recodified as § 35.52. See id. § 35.52.
21. Tnx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Section 35.51 introduced
controversial additions to Texas choice of law rules, including the ability to choose a law contrary to
both Texas public policy and the public policy of the state with a more significant relation to the
transaction, id. § 35.51(b), and the ability to choose a law lacking a reasonable relation to the parties and
the transaction, id. § 35.51(c).
22. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
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B. Pleading by One or More Litigants3
A litigant may trigger choice of law issues by a timely and proper
pleading of the reason to apply a foreign law and proof of the content of
that law. u It is unclear, however, whether pleadingis always required.
Because Texas state and federal courts are required to take judicial notice
of the laws of other States in the United States, a litigant seeking the
application of another State's law may get by with less than a pleading -
perhaps a mere request on record to the court will suffice. If the request is
beyond the pleading deadline, opposing parties may have a valid objection
to the surprise if they have no prior notice.
C. Sua Sponte Choice of Law
If the lawsuit contains a foreign element suggesting that non-forum law
may be appropriate, but the parties have not raised a choice of law issue, the
court may consider choice of law on its own motion.25
23. Defendants, of course, more likely than plaintiffs are to ask for foreign law. The goal of
forum-shopping plaintiffs is often more than merely suing defendants in a convenient forum. Plaintiffs
also seek to increase the chances of having the forum state's law applied. For example, if one wishes
to sue under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act in a fact setting having little contact with Texas,
the chances of having the Texas DTPA apply increase markedly if the suit is brought in Texas. Two
prominent reasons are: (I) the forum's natural preference for its own law, based both on convenience
and provincialism; and (2) some judges' erroneous belief that defendant's amenability to the forum's
judicial jurisdiction supports the application of forum law. But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (both holding that forum state jurisdiction
did not compel application of forum state law). Defendants should not acquiesce to plaintiffs' push for
forum law. If the case has a foreign element, one should consider the arguments (under the forum's
choice of law rules) for applying another state's law.
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. If the forum state has legislative jurisdiction and the parties have failed to request the
application of any foreign law, the court may apply forum law under the presumptions listed in Part V.A
of this Article. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. However, the court is not required to follow
the presumptions favoring forum law; it may instead conduct a full choice of law analysis to determine
the most appropriate law.
If the forum state lacks legislative jurisdiction and the parties have failed to request the application
of foreign law, then the parties should be advised of the inappropriateness of forum law and be requested
to provide arguments on the identity and content of applicable foreign law(s). If the parties provide
arguments and evidence for the application of only one foreign law that has legislative jurisdiction, then
it should be applied. If the parties argue for more than one foreign law with legislative jurisdiction, then
a choice of law analysis should be conducted as described in Part IV of this Article. If the parties fail
to provide any sufficient choice of law arguments, the court may:
a. apply forum law under the presumption that it is the same as the unproven foreign
law, or that the parties have acquiesced to forum law, see infra Part V.A. or
b. dismiss the case if the pertinent forum law (hypothetically lacking legislative
jurisdiction) is unsuited or unintended for the presumptions stated above; or
c. consider choice of law sua sponte (on its own motion) by determining which states
have a minimal relationship to the action, then choosing the most appropriate state's law as
will be explained in Part IV. These three options are discretionary.
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IV. CHOICE OF LAW ADVOCACY
A. Identify the Choice of Law Problem
1. Which Issues are Affected?
Are Different Issues Governed by Different States' Laws?
Texas and several other states practice depegage - choice of law
analysis on an issue-by-issue basis.26 The question arises: do the contacts
and public policy interests in your case dictate the application of one state's
law to one isolated issue, or will the entire substantive claim be governed
by one state's law?
2. Which States' Laws Might Apply?
Courts look not only to the states obviously connected (such as where
the event occurred), but other states whose interests are at stake. Litigants
faced with this issue should also examine the pertinent sections of the
Restatement (Second), such as sections 6, 145, 188 and others to determine
the important connecting factors for their case, and to identify potentially
interested states.
3. Is There a Genuine Conflict?
According to Justice Stevens's dissent in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts,27 along with the opinions of many scholars, a true conflict exists
only if there is a potentially outcome-determinative distinction between the
laws of two or more affected states. According to this strict reading of false
conflicts, the conflict must exist as to one or more material issues, and each
conflicting state must have clearly established law on point. Mere
ambiguities should not be construed as creating a conflict. On the other
hand, the Phillips majority was willing to perceive a conflict where the laws
Generally option (a) is preferable because it resolves the dispute instead of dismissing it, and does
so under the substantive law the court presumably prefers. See George, supra note 1, at 794-95 nn.18-
29.
26. See infra Part VI.B. In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the Texas Supreme Court stated:
"[l]n all choice of law cases, except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid
choice of law clause, the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the particular
substantive issue will be applied to resolve that issue." Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.. 665 S.W.2d 414,
421 (Tex. 1984) (emphasis added). For an example of d~pegage, see Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
607 F. Supp. 1341. 1352 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1088 (1987).
27. 472 U.S. 797. 823-45 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), see also
infra Part VI.D (discussing false conflicts).
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were not precise. Thus, if a state's law is ambiguous and can be argued to
your favor, argue that the Phillips majority impliedly authorizes a choice of
law even where no clear conflict exists' If the ambiguity is not in your
favor, argue the Stevens dissent in Phillips.2 8
Some states use a slightly different definition of false conflict, for which
this argument might not apply.
29
4. What Results are Wanted?
Advocates should remember that choice of law is an advocate's tool,
both at the transactional stage and the litigation stage. If contacts with the
desired state are weak, argue other factors such as parties' expectations or
public policy. Advocates should not make the common mistake of viewing
choice of law as a legal barrier. Choice of law can be used as an opportuni-
ty to advance a case.
B. Be Prepared to Argue that the Chosen Law Satisfies:
1. The Forum State's Choice of Law Rules
The forum state will apply its own choice of law rules, most likely in
the following priority: (1) specific statutes, (2) choice of law clauses in
contracts, and (3) the forum's general choice of law rule.
a. Statutes
Because statutes supersede common law, a choice of law statute will
supersede the forum's general choice of law rule, which tends to be common
law. Even if a State had a statutory general choice of law rule, that rule
would nonetheless be superseded by a more specific choice of law statute
focused on a particular substantive area of law. Restatement (Second)
section 6(1) reflects the priority of choice of law statutes. A choice of law
28. Justice Stevens complains that the Court's majority engaged in an unwarranted review of the
Kansas Supreme Court's choice of law decision. Pointing out that the Kansas court examined the
pertinent state's laws and found "no 'direct' or 'substantive' conflict," 472 U.S. at 824, Stevens
concludes that the Supreme Court "long ago decided that state-court choices of law are unreviewable
here absent demonstration of an unambiguous conflict in the established laws of connected States." Id.
at 845. But see Faloona 607 F. Supp. at 1341, in which both the trial and appellate courts engaged in
a thorough choice of law analysis, with the Fifth Circuit reversing the trial court on the application of
California law to half the case, only to conclude that California and Texas laws were either the same or
produced the same outcome. To avoid this problem, the court should place the burden on the party
seeking the application of nonforum law to demonstrate an unambiguous conflict.
29. See Part VI.D; see also infra APPENDIX B (providing alternative definitions of "false
conflicts").
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statute will also supersede the parties' contractual choice of law because the
parties cannot enter an agreement that evades a statute unless the legislature
permits it by so providing in the choice of law statute itself, or in another
statute.
30
If there are no statutes on point, then one should consider the next
priority.
b. Agreement By the Parties in a Pre-Lawsuit Contract
Litigants should follow the guidelines described in Part III.A, supra,
taking care to verify not only that the choice of law agreement is valid, but
that the forum does not legislatively preempt such clauses in your specific
contract. Some states may also preempt a choice of law agreement if the
chosen law is contrary to the public policy of a state with a more significant
relation to or interest in the transaction.3'
If there is no valid agreement, express or implied by the parties, then
consider the final priority.
c. The Forum's General Choice of Law Rule
General choice of law rules are usually common law, that is, mandated
by the courts rather than the legislature. Starting in 1984 with Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 Texas has used the most significant relationship test
from the Restatement (Second) section 6, which provides a seven-factor
balancing test:
(1) the needs of the interstate and international systems - focuses
on promoting harmony between states by choice of law rules that other
states regard as fair,
33
30. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994). See
APPENDIX A for a partial list of Texas and federal choice of law statutes.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2)(a) and cml. g (1988).
32. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). In Duncan, the court stated that "in all choice of law cases
except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause, the law of
the state with the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be applied to
resolve that issue." Id. at 421.
Note that the court adopted only the most significant relationship test, and not the Restatement
(Second) in its entirety. In fact, Duncan expressly declined adoption of Restatement (Second) § 170.
665 S.W.2d at 420 n.4. Because the most significant relationship test [as stated in § 6 of the Restatement
(Second)] interacts with most of the other choice of law provisions in the Restatement (Second), one may
argue that Duncan does adopt all such choice of law provisions in the Restatement (Second). However,
the most realistic view is that Duncan adopted only § 6. This view is underscored by the court's
piecemeal adoption of the Restatement (Second) since Duncan. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,
793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (adopting §§ 187, 188, 196), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991). Even if
Duncan did not adopt all choice of law provisions in the Restatement (Second), its other choice of law
rules should be persuasive.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 6(2)(a) and cmt. d (1988).
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(2) the relevant policies of the forum - determined by the forum's
pertinent substantive law and contacts with the dispute;4
(3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue
this, along with factor (2), creates a weighing of states' interests;
3 5
(4) the protection of justified expectations - most appropriate to
contracts, least appropriate to negligence;
36
(5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law
addresses cases in which the policies of the interested states are the
same, but there are minor differences in specific laws, e.g. usury and
trusts;
37
(6) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result,3 8
(7) ease in determination and application of law - that is, choice
of law rules should not result in a law that is too difficult for the court
to apply.
3 9
These factors are not exclusive and may be supplemented as justice
requires. Moreover, the factors are not listed in order of importance, and
will have varying significance in different cases. In all but the simplest
cases the factors will point in different directions, that is, to different choices
of law. These factors are meant to reflect competing interests, and some
choices may be difficult.' But if the court considers all factors in these
difficult cases, and gives them the weight the court deems appropriate, a fair
result will likely occur.
As noted above, Restatement (Second) section 6 is a balancing test,
requiring at least initial consideration of all seven factors. Some courts have
overlooked the balancing feature and treated section 6 as a laundry list from
which the most prominent factor decides choice of law. While only the
hardest cases should involve all seven factors, a decision based on one or
two factors will short-circuit the balancing test. Although one factor may
stand out in a choice of law problem, the court should not allow that one
factor's prominence to undermine a fair consideration of the other factors
which may, when fully considered, reveal interests competing with the
34. Id. § 6(2)(b) and cmt. e. see also, George, supra note 1, at 798 n.37 (discussing the
potentially countervailing effect of a forum states' "strongly-held" public policy); "State Interest" in
APPENDIX B.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6(2)(a) and cmt. f (1988). Although
another state may have a strong interest relating to the lawsuit (such as a strict usury law). that state's
interest in the particular lawsuit itself may be minor compared to the interests of the forum and other
states, thus making the strong policy of the first state less important in this particular dispute. See id.
§ 6 cnt. f; "State Interest" in APPENDIX B.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFPUCr OF LAws § 6 cmt g (1988).
37. Id. § 6(2)(e) and cmt. h.
38. Id. § 6(2)(f) and cmt. i.
39. Id. § 6(2)(g) and ant. j.
40. See id. § 6(2) and cmt. c.
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interests in the prominent factor. By the same reasoning, advocates should
not allow the prominence of one or two factors to cloud their insight as to
other factors that could enhance their arguments for the application of a
more favorable law.
One final point is the interplay between section 6 and the Restatement
(Second)'s other sections. If any of the Restatement Second's specific rules
for issues in contract, torts, and other areas apply, use them with the seven
factors of the most significant relationship test. Note that in Duncan, the
supreme court adopted only the most significant relationship test as
expressed in Restatement (Second) § 6.41 The court did not adopt the
Restatement (Second) in its entirety, but instead has adopted other sections
piecemeal.42 Nonetheless, the Restatement (Second)'s other choice of law
sections - addressing specific issues in tort (§§ 145-185), contract (§§ 186-
221), property (§§ 222-266), trusts (Q§ 267-282), business corporations (§§
296-313) and other areas - should be persuasive.
This discussion applies only to Texas, and to a lesser extent, other States
using the Restatement (Second). For a discussion of choice of law in other
States and foreign countries, see infra Parts VIII & IX.
2. The Federal Constitution (and the Forum State Constitution, if
Pertinent)
An advocate may wish to defer this argument until the opponent or the
court raises it. The use of constitutional issues in an initial argument will
complicate it unnecessarily, because constitutional choice of law issues need
not be pleaded initially. Instead, such issues should be raised in response to
an opponent's objection to a choice of law request. However, one should
always consider the constitutional issues whether argued them or not.
The United States Supreme Court has relied primarily on two consti-
tutional doctrines for limiting states' choices of governing law: due process,
and full faith and credit. Due process prevents the forum from applying the
law of any state (including foreign countries) that lacks a reasonable
connection to the parties or the dispute.43 Full faith and credit requires the
41. 665 S.W.2d at 421
42. See e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 680-81 (Tex. 1990), cert .denied,
498 U.S. 1048 (1991) (adopting § 187). Prior to Duncan, the supreme court adopted §§ 6 & 145, limited
to tort issues, in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979) and § 169 regarding spousal
tort immunity in Robertson v. Estate of McKnight. 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980).
43. The Due Process Clause requires a reasonable (sometimes termed "minimal" or "sufficient")
connection between a legal dispute and the state whose substantive law is applied to it. This requirement
is known as "legislative jurisdiction," and it governs all choice of law problems including those of
contractually chosen law. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 9 and ant. d (1988). Justice Stevens has noted that
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forum to weigh the policies and interests of other affected States in the
United States (not foreign countries), and to apply the law of another State
if its interests significantly outweigh those of the forum State.'
Litigants should note the similarity between the full faith and credit
requirements and the interest-balancing factors of the most significant
relationship test.45 Full faith and credit merely establishes a vague mandate
to consider other States' interests - it does not mandate a deference to
those interests unless they significantly outweigh the forum's interests. Due
process, on the other hand, mandates that the forum apply only the laws of
a State with some connection to the parties and the dispute.
In addition to due process and full faith and credit, five other consti-
tutional doctrines may limit the States' choice of law rules: Equal Protec-
choice of law creates due process concerns in three ways: (1) unfair surprise; (2) irrational favoring of
residents over nonresidents; and (3) "dramatic departure from the rule that obtains in most American
jurisdictions." 449 U.S. at 326-27.
This minimal connection is similar to the minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants. Unfortunately there is very little guidance as to what constitutes a minimal
connection in legislative jurisdiction. For suggestions in establishing the minimal connection, see
George. supra note I, at 791 n.14.
If either party establishes to the court's satisfaction that the chosen law has legislative jurisdiction,
that law should be applied. If the court is not persuaded, or if the parties fail to provide arguments on
legislative jurisdiction, the court may:
a. apply forum law, if the forum has legislative jurisdiction;
b. if the forum state lacks legislative jurisdiction but has judicial jurisdiction (which is
unlikely but not impossible), the court may raise choice of law sua sponte. Another option is
for the court to exercise the presumption that by failing to prove the contents of any foreign
law, the parties have acquiesced to application of forum law; or
c. if the forum state lacks legislative jurisdiction and the court fails to find the contents
of another suitable law, the court should either apply forum law, under the presumption that
unproven foreign law is the same as forum law, or dismiss the case. See Humphrey v.
Bullock, 666 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. App.-Ausin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This situation will
not happen often, but is possible where a plaintiff sues for tortious injury occurring in a foreign
country where the laws are not widely published.
Legislative jurisdiction can be complex and difficult. Fortunately, the problem does not arise often.
If the forum state has judicial jurisdiction, the same underlying contacts between the forum and the
defendant will usually-but not always-create legislative jurisdiction. Thus, forum law is a likely
substitute if the parties' requested foreign law lacks legislative jurisdiction.
One need not address legislative jurisdiction in every choice of law situation. It requires analysis
only when raised by the opposing party, or by the court in obvious cases. However, while the pleadings
may overlook legislative jurisdiction, the actual examination of a choice of law problem--by the parties
or the court-should always consider the issue.
44. E.g., 472 U.S. at 814-23; 449 U.S. at 307-20.
45. See supra Part IV.B.I.c (factors 2 and 3).
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tion,46 Privileges and Immunities,47 the Commerce Clause,4" the Suprem-
acy Clause,49 and, possibly, the Contract Clause.
C. Pleading and Proof of Non-Forum Law
If the preferred law is not forum law, then litigants must carefully
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. These
rules are procedural, and thus strictly governed by forum law without
recourse to choice of law possibilities. Texas and federal courts provide two
examples that show the similarity, but also the subtle distinctions between
jurisdictions.
1. In Texas Courts
a. Judicial Notice of Other States' Laws in Texas Courts
Texas law provides in part that:
(1) A court, upon its own motion may, or, upon the motion of a
party, shall take judicial notice of the constitutions, rules, regulations,
ordinances, court decisions and common law of every other State,
territory or jurisdiction of the United States;
(2) A party requesting judicial notice shall furnish the court
sufficient information to enable it to comply properly.50
b. Proving Foreign Country Law in Texas Courts
Texas law also provides in part that:
(1) the party relying on the law of a foreign country shall give
notice by pleading or other reasonable written notice at least thirty days
prior to trial;
(2) notice must include all written materials or sources to be offered
as proof of the foreign law;
46. Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp.. 262 U.S. 544, 551 (1923).
47. Cf. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (holding a
residency requirement for admission to the bar violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
48. See generally Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674,682 (1965) (adopting the rule that the state
of a corporation's domicile may cut off the claims of private persons only and not the claims of another
state with proof of a superior right).
49. Cf. McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) (holding that state courts
cannot deny jurisdiction solely because claims are brought under federal statutes). Texas courts neither
certified originals or photicopies, but do require particularized pleadings as to other State's law. Cal.
Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse Transfer Co., 687 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, no writ).
50. See TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 202 (formerly TE R. Civ. P. 184).
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(3) if the foreign law's original text is not English, the party must
provide both the original non-English text and an English translation;
(4) evidence of foreign law includes affidavits, testimony, briefs,
treatises, and any other material source, whether or not submitted by a
party, and whether or not admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence.
If the court considers sources not offered by a party, it must give
reasonable notice, an opportunity to comment on the sources, and an
opportunity to submit further materials;
(5) the determination of foreign law is a question of law, not fact.
(This may seem a truism today, but is a relatively recent change in the
law.)
51
2. In Federal Court
a. Judicial Notice of States' Laws in Federal Court
By federal common law, federal courts must take judicial notice of the
laws of all States in the United States.
52
b. Proving Foreign Country Laws in Federal Court
Federal law provides for the pleading and proof of foreign country law
by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. In determining the content,
the court may consider testimony or any other relevant material or source,
51. TEx R. Civ. EvID. 203 (formerly TEX R. Civ. P. 184a).
52. Interestingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence intentionally abstain from judicial notice of
states' laws, noting the provision for judicial notice of foreign country law in FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1, and
suggesting that the rules of civil procedure are more appropriate for designating the proper method for
pleading and proof of non-federal law. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, do not address pleading and proof of states' laws, leaving only the
federal common law of Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885) (holding that federal courts must take
judicial notice of the laws of any State). Accord Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th
Cir. 1987). Even though FD. R. EVID. 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice)
does not cover states' laws, we should assume that the judicial notice mandate for states' law in Lamar
is subject to FED. R. EVID. 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters "capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." That is, judicial
notice of States' laws is taken from the official statutory and case reports of a given state, by unofficial
versions that are widely used. or by copies, all subject to federal evidentiary laws on authentication and
bestevidence. Somewhat inconsistent with Lamar, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) (the full faith and credit
statute) provides for authentication of legislative acts and court records and proceedings of "any State,
Territory, or Possession of the United States," thus allowing a means of offering states' laws into federal
court. Id. However, this authentication provision apparently does not apply to the mere proof of content
of a states' law in a federal diversity case. If 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does require proof of the content of
state's laws by authenticated copies, this is inconsistent with Lamar and its progeny, as well as the
current practice in federal court.
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whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not admissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence.53
V. PRESUMPTIONS AND PREFERENCES
A. Preference for Forum Law
Forum law should be applied in Texas courts unless another law is
shown to be more appropriate by the parties' agreement or a Texas choice
of law rule. Forum law is favored by presumption in two situations. First,
the parties may request application of a foreign law but fail to prove its
contents. It may then be presumed that either Texas law is the same as the
unproven foreign law, or that the parties have acquiesced in the application
of Texas forum law by failing to meet the burden of proving their requested
foreign law.54
Second, all other things being equal, forum law applies. That is, where
the forum state has a relationship to the dispute as significant as other
affected states, forum law is applied. Note however that this rule does not
apply where the parties have made a valid pre-lawsuit choice of law
agreement. In those cases the choice of law analysis is never reached, and
significant relationships are never evaluated.
B. Situs Presumptions
The Restatement (Second)'s specific subject matter choice of law rules
presume the applicability of certain foreign laws related to the situs of the
event giving rise to the cause of action. For example, Restatement (Second)
section 146 states that in an action for personal injury, the local law of the
state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties. These presumptions reflect many of the old
mechanical choice of law rules - such as lex locus delicti and lex locus
contractus - that were the basis of common law choice of law and the first
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. In the Restatement (Second) these situs
presumptions retain the ease of application of the old mechanical rules
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 is a briefer version of the requirements in TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 203.
54. E.g., Humphrey v. Bullock, 666 S.W.2d 586,589 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd. n.r.e.);
Creavin v. Moloney, 773 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). This rule has
also been applied in federal court. E.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d
1000, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1990). See TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 202 and 203 for the requirement of furnishing
the court with sufficient information to determine the content of nonform law. See also George, supra
note 1. at 800 n.43 (discussing the presumption that unproved foreign law is identical to Texas law).
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without their sometimes harsh, inflexible results.55 The Restatement
(Second) accomplishes this by providing that a certain state's law will apply
unless another state has a more significant relationship under the factors set
out in the Restatement (Second) section 6.56
C. Preference for the Parties' Chosen Law in Contractual Lawsuits
Restatement (Second) sections 187 through 197 govern choice of law in
particular contracts, and gives the parties' contractually chosen law priority
over (1) forum law, (2) the situs-based presumptions discussed in the
preceding paragraph, and (3) any other choice of law determined by the
forum state's statutory or general choice of law rules. This preference for
the parties' chosen law in contract actions is also reflected in Texas
statutes,57 and in the seminal choice of law holding in Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co.5"
The parties' choice is merely a presumptive preference, however. It can
be displaced if the choice lacks legislative jurisdiction,59 if the results are
contrary to strongly-held forum state policy, or if the results are contrary to
a strongly-held policy of the state whose law would be applied if not for the
parties' choice of law.6'
D. Presumption Against Renvoi
As discussed infra in section VI.C., renvoi is the practice of using the
choice of law rules of one or more states other than the forum state.61
Some attorneys avoid choice of law issues because of the difficulty of
dealing with renvoi, and an incorrect belief that renvoi is an ever-present
analytical requirement. It is not. Restatement (Second) section 8 provides
that choice of law rules should be read as excluding renvoi unless either of
two narrow exceptions are present.62 In addition, Restatement (Second)
55. See George, supra note 1, at 802 n.48.
56. See supra Part IV.B.l.c.
57. See TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994). But see
TEXL REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 9.03 (Vernon 1964).
58. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); see supra note 32.
59. This is defined as a reasonable connection between the chosen state and the dispute. See
supra note 17.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2)(b) (1988); cf. DeSantis v.
Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (rex. 1990),
cert. denied, (holding that where parties include choice of law provisions in their contract. judicial respect
for that choice advances the public policy of protecting contracting parties' expectations) 498 U.S. 1048
(1991).
61. See infra Part VI.C.
62. See infra note 81.
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section 187(3) provides that choice of law clauses in contracts should be
read as excluding renvoi unless the parties expressly adopt renvoi.63
VI. OTHER FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Characterization
Characterization is the process of labeling, defining, or categorizing the
facts and legal concepts in a lawsuit. It exists in all lawsuits, but has two
special functions in choice of law situations. First, characterizing a claim
as tort rather than contract may change the forum's choice of law.
64
Similarly, characterizing an issue as procedural rather than substantive may
bring that issue under forum procedural law instead of foreign substantive
law.
Characterization's second special function for choice of law is the
determination of which law controls the characterization of a lawsuit's facts
and issues. The Restatement (Second) provides that forum law controls the
characterization of "the form of the action" (e.g., law versus equity or
contract versus tort) and the conflict of laws issues.65 Forum law also
controls several traditionally procedural issues, especially those regarding the
conduct of the litigation.' All other issues, concepts, and legal terms are
characterized by the law governing that issue (i.e., the law chosen by the
forum state's choice of law rule).67 The Restatement (Second) prefers this
flexible approach to characterization, and avoids rigid labels that would
determine choice of law without considering the particular issue's function
in the lawsuit.6s This approach allows foreign law to play a determining
role to insure that foreign-based claims are not cut short on their substantive
content by the forum's contrary characterizations. However, the Restatement
(Second)'s flexible characterization can be difficult in some cases. If the
court finds it too difficult to characterize a particular issue under foreign
law, it should use forum law for practicality.69
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3) (1988).
64. As with most choice of law theories, the Restatement (Second) uses different rules for
contract choice of law than for tort. In many situations having both tort and contract elements, the
contract elements will have occurred in one stale and the tort elements in another. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 n.4, 421 (Tex. 1984). Thus, characterizing the claim as one
of contract may produce a different choice than if the claim were in tort.
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7(2), 124 (1988).
66. Id. § 122.
67. Id. § 7(3); George, supra note I, at 804 n.60.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1988).
69. Two examples of problems with the characterization approach that the Restatement (Second)
employs are:
(i) Choice of law for contract cases sometimes turns on whether the dispute relates to the
contract's validity or its performance. If the issue is validity, the law of the place of the
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Characterization is the first step in any choice of law analysis - indeed
in any lawsuit. Characterization could have been the first step of the
analysis proposed in this Article. Nevertheless, it is not because in most
cases characterization is effortless. In difficult cases, however, characteriza-
tion may provide an escape from an unfavorable law.
B. D~pegage
Ddpeqage is the practice of splitting multiple claims in a lawsuit, or
multiple issues in a claim, and applying different states' laws to the separate
issues or claims. ° Ddpeqage is controlled by forum law, and is largely
within the court's discretion.7' Texas law requires ddpeqage, that is, choice
of law on an issue-by-issue basis.
72
C. Renvoi
In certain cases, forum law may direct the application of the "whole
law" of the chosen state, that is, the other state's entire law, including its
choice of law rules. This practice of second-tier choice of law is called
renvoi, and is appropriate in certain limited cases where the forum wants the
same legal result that would be reached by the courts of the chosen state.
Sometimes renvoi is intended by the forum's statutory instruction to apply
"the law" of the other state, instead of the clearer term "whole law.' 
73
In these ambiguous cases, the court must decide if the intent is to reach the
same result as the other state's court would reach, or merely to apply the
contract's making is preferred (though not mandated). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFUCT OF LAWS § 199 (1988). If the issue is performance, the law of the place of
performance is preferred. Id. §§ 202(2). 206. The Restatement (Second) section 7 provides
that the most appropriate substantive law ought to govern the characterization of validity and
performance separately. Id. § 7. But how can the appropriate substantive law be applied to
characterize the dispute as being one of validity or performance, when the appropriate
substantive law cannot be selected until the characterization is completed? It seems that only
forum law will allow the case to proceed at this point. The same circularity problem exists in
some instances of substance/procedure characterization.
(2) A second characterization problem is that once the court has chosen the appropriate
law for characterizing an issue, that law may be vague or incomplete. Moreover, even if the
foreign law is sufficiently developed for characterizing the issue, the necessary specifics of that
foreign law may be difficult for the court to find. As with the first problem, forum law is the
practical alternative.
70. George, supra note I. at 805.
71. Id.
72. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
73. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.402(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); Id §
4.102(b); Id. § 6.102(b), repealed, Act of June 11, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 570, § 16, 1993 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 2147 (Vernon) (effective September 1, 1993).
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substantive law of the other state.74 Jurisdictions in the United States use
renvoi sparingly, but foreign states with laws based on the Napoleonic Civil
Code tend to use renvoi routinely.
Renvoi is required in some portions of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code.75 Restatement (Second) section 8 addresses revoi, and
further suggests renvoi in certain cases involving real property,76 personal
property,77 succession of decedents' interests in movables,78 and trusts."
The Restatement (Second) also notes the practice of renvoi in certain
domicile issues.80 The Restatement (Second)'s renvoi sections are at least
persuasive, but may not be controlling in Texas unless they are officially
embraced by the Texas Supreme Court, which has thus far adopted only a
few sections of the Restatement (Second). Federal law uses renvoi to select
the applicable law for claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.1
Courts should presume against renvoi. It should be used only when
forum law expressly indicates, or when the forum's choice of law rule seeks
the same result that a court in the chosen state would reach by applying its
own choice of law rule.Y
D. False Conflicts
A false conflict occurs when the laws of two or more states are the
same, or produce the same result. If there are identical laws on point in all
states being considered, there is no choice of law problem. The one law is
applied. If there are identical laws in two or more states, but not all the
states being considered, the states with identical laws should be treated as
one state, adding their choice of law contacts and interests.83 Remember
that Texas choice of law is done on an issue-by-issue basis.84 Thus, there
may be false conflicts in some issues and real conflicts in other issues in the
same cases. If fact, this mix will appear in most choice of law cases.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 8 (1988).
75. See APPENDIX A, Nos. 2, 3, 5-8.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICt OF LAws §§ 223-26, 228, 230-42 (1988).
77. Id. §§ 245, 248-49. 253, 255.
78. Id. §§ 260-63. 264(2).
79. Id. §§ 269. 274-75. 277-82.
80. Id.§ 13 cmt. c.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8 (1988), which discusses the
presumption that where the forum's choice of law roles direct the application of "the law" of another
State, it is presumed to be the local law. That is, the substantive law not including the forum's choice
of law rules that would direct the choice to another State. Section 187(3) provides that unless the parties
indicate otherwise, a contractual choice of law clause is presumed to select only the local law of the
chosen State. See generally id. § 186 cmt. b (providing further discussion).
83. Id. § 145 cmt. i; § 186 cmL c; see also George, supra note 1, at 807 n.69 (providing
additional sources for a comprehensive discussion of false conflicts).
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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One should note that the foregoing definition is from the Restatement
(Second) and is the most common. A few jurisdictions using Currie's
"government interest analysis"' s define false conflicts as those in which
only one state has a real interest (with state interest calculated sometimes on
the existence of state law on point, sometimes on the state's contacts with
the dispute, and sometimes on other factors). Avoid this interest-based
definition unless the forum uses governmental interest analysis.
VII. FEDERAL COURTS
The fundamental choice of law problem in federal courts is whether
State or federal law will govern a particular issue in a case. The Erie
Doctrine86 attempts to resolve this. This Article does not discuss Erie
problems in depth because Erie analysis differs from traditional territorial
choice of law, with quite distinct analytical elements. Because Erie
problems are distinct, they are excluded from the Restatement (Second)'s
choice of law rules.g While this Article does not provide an Erie analysis,
the following generalizations apply to federal court choice of law where
the Erie problems are already resolved. These generalizations are directed
only to choice of substantive law, as is this entire Article.8
A. Diversity Cases
Erie mandates that substantive issues in diversity cases be governed not
by federal law, but by the law of the State in which the federal court is
located, including that State's choice of law rules. Thus, federal courts
sitting in diversity cases will apply State or foreign country law to
substantive issues, as directed by the local State's choice of law rules.89
85. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
86. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The source for Erie-type problems is the
Rules of Decision Act, adopted in 1789, now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). Although seldom
cited, it is the primary federal choice of law rule. providing that "[the laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply." Id. From this premise, the Erie Doctrine now controls the conflict of federal and State law
in federal courts. 304 U.S. at 71. The current Erie test is stated in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFuC OF LAWS § 2 cmt. c (1988).
88. Traditional choice of law inquiry focuses on substantive law, assuming that forum law will
govern procedure. But see Part VIL.A (discussing the role of procedural issues in choice of law). This
traditional practice is followed in courts of general jurisdiction in the United States, but not in federal
courts. There, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to Erie analysis. The issue is then
determined by the law selected by the Erie process. See 19 CHARLES A. WRIGHT Err AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 4501-15 (1982); see also infra note 103 (discussing the Erie test).
89. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
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One exception is for diversity cases transferred from a federal court in
another State under federal venue law;9" in these cases the first State's
choice of law rule is used.9'
B. Federal Claims
Federal claims should not involve a traditional choice of law analysis.
Substantive issues in federal claims (based on the Constitution, federal
statutes or regulations, federal common law, treaties, or public international
law) are usually governed by the appropriate federal law, or by the law
chosen by a specific federal choice of law rule.' Some substantive issues
in these cases may be governed by State law because of an Erie ruling (or
because the particular federal law has gaps that require "borrowing" from
State law), and not because of a territorial choice of law rule.
VIII. WHAT IF TEXAS IS NOT YOUR FORUM?
When litigating in any other forum, in or out of the United States, the
basic steps in this Article should apply if adjusted to that forum's law and
vantage point.
A. Choice of Law in Other States in the United States
First identify the forum; then identify the forum's pertinent choice of
law rules. Using the process in this article, that search would follow these
steps:
(1) Forum statutes linked to specific substantive areas.93 If no
statute applies, then a...
(2) Valid choice of law agreement between the parties, if the forum
honors such clauses at all (most do for most contracts), and if this
particular contract is not excluded." If neither of the above apply,
then look to...
(3) The forum's general choice of law rule, which should be part of
the State's common law. In addition to the most significant relationship
test, some of the other choice of law systems used in the United States
are:
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988).
91. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n.8 (1981).
92. See APPENDIX A. Nos. 22-26.
93. See APPENDIX A for examples of Texa choice of law statutes for specific areas.
94. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 35.53 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (set forth in APPENDIX
A. infra): TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981) (set forth in APPENDIX A, infra); supra note
20 and accompanying text.
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(a) Currie's -government interest analysis" (California,
New Jersey), which seeks to identify the State having the
greatest interest in the lawsuit, and measures state interest by
the State's law and policy on point, and the pertinence of that
law and policy to the facts of the case. (Note that a version of
interest analysis appears in factors 2 and 3 of the most signifi-
cant relationship test.)
95
(b) Leflar's "Choice Influencing Considerations" (Min-
nesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin), which resembles the
Restatement (Second)'s most significant relationship test. In
fact, both tests were inspired by a 1952 article by Elliot
Cheatham and Willis Reese.96 Reese was the principle archi-
tect of the Restatement (Second) and the most significant
relationship test.
97
(c) The lex loci, or vested rights, theories in the original
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, are still used in about twenty
States. These theories focus on the location of a key event,
rather than the more modem focus on expectation of the parties,
state interests, and other factors. Lex loci rules include the
familiar "law of the place of the wrong" to govem torts.98
Many of these old rules are retained in the Restatement (Second)
as presumptions of which law should apply unless another state
has a more significant relationship to the parties or the occur-
rence.
99
A State may use one choice of law system for torts and another for
contracts. For example, Florida applies the First Restatement's vested
rights rules to contract cases, and the Restatement (Second)'s most
significant relationship test to torts. Indiana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and the District of Columbia have also split choice of law for
contracts and torts.1°
95. For a discussion of Currie's views, see WILLIS L.M. REEsE ET AL. CONFuCT OF LAWS 487-
89 (9th ed. 1990) and ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL, AmEiICAN CONFLICTS LAw 263-64, 267-70 (4th ed.
1986).
96. Elliot E. Cheatham and Willis LM. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REv. 959 (1952).
97. See generally LEFLAR. supra note 94, at 277-79 (discussing the academic origins of "choice
influencing considerations").
98. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFUCT OF LAWS (1934).
99. See. e.g.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONI..CT OF LAWS § 146 (1988) (mandating the
application of the law of the situs of the injury unless sone other state has a more significant relationship
under the factors of Restatement (Second) § 6).
100. For a complete description of United States choice of law systems, see Gregory E. Smith,
Choice of Law in the United States. 38 HASTINGS LJ. 1041 (1987); Herna Hill Kay, Theory Into
Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L REv. 521 (1983). Note that these two articles
are surveys of a difficult area of law, and while informative, are not necessarily accurate or up to date.
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(4) United States Constitution
Follow the constitutional analysis stated above.01  Under due
process, ask whether there is a sufficient or reasonable connection
between the dispute and the state whose law is being applied.
1°2
Under full faith and credit, ask if the forum properly evaluated the
interests of all concerned States to determine if one State's interest
sufficiently predominates so that its law must be applied.10 3 For other
clauses inquire whether this is a rare case in which Equal Protection,
Privileges and Immunities, or another constitutional clause might direct
choice of law. 1' 4
B. Choice of Law in Foreign Countries
As with other States in the United States, the first step in choice of law
analysis for foreign countries is to identify the specific forum, e.g. is it a
Canadian federal court or a provincial court in Ontario? Once you have
specified the forum, identify the forum's pertinent choice of law rules. To
find the choice of law rules, look to:
(1) Legislation, which is used in most civil-law jurisdictions for
choice of law rules;
(2) Common law, case precedent, or custom;
(3) Constitutional rules, similar to the due process and full faith and
credit limits on choice of law in State and federal courts in the United
States, which may also exist in foreign countries; and
(4) Treaties and conventions: For choice of law purposes, there
are three kinds of treaties:
(a) Dispositive treaties with no choice of law rules, such as
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods;0 5
Smith s more recent article is accurate on Texas' use of the most significant relationship test, but is only
roughly accurate in its analysis of Texas courts' application of the test. Readers should use these articles
as starting points for further research into any particular State's choice of law rules.
101. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 42.
103. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
105. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for
signature Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980). 19 LLM. 668 (1980) (entered into force Jan.
1, 1988). The Convention is loosely comparable to an "international U.C.C. Article 2." Article 7(2)
of the Convention provides that questions not resolved by the Convention are to be settled in conformity
with "the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law," 19 L.LM. at 673, that is,
the rules of conflict of laws. This presumably refers to the forum's private international law rules, but
the Convention is not clear on this. Whether it invokes the forum's rules or not, Article 7(2) is not a
true choice of law rule because it does not select the applicable law or provide any criteria as to how to
select it. Instead, it merely states the obvious - that issues outside the Convention will be resolved by
conflict of law rules.
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(b) Treaties that are mostly dispositive law, but that include
choice of law rules, such as the Warsaw Convention;'06
(c) Choice of law treaties with few or no dispositive
provisions. An example is the not-yet-enacted European
Community Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations,'07 which uses the concept of "closest connection"
as evidenced by the "characteristic performance"' 0' to choose
the governing law. This standard may appear to resemble the
Restatement (Second)'s most significant relationship test, but
attorneys should not hastily equate the two. 9 Other exam-
ples are the various Inter-American Conventions on Private
International Law." 0
Note also that this Convention is an example of "vertical choice of law" as opposed to the
horizontal choice of law discussed in this article. Vertical choice of law is a conflict between two
overlapping authorities, such as the Texas Legislature and the United States Congress. In the United
States, two vertical choice of law rules apply to such conflicts:
(1) The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution dictates that where
applicable, federal substantive law preempts State substantive law.
(2) The Erie Doctrine provides that where federal procedure conflicts with State law
(either substance or procedure), that:
(a) a pertinent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or Federal Rule of Evidence will
apply over conflicting State law, provided that the Rule does not abridge, enlarge or
modify a substantive right. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,465 (1965); 28 U.S.C. 2072
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
(b) if the conflict is between a federal procedure not found in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence, then the court must balance State and
federal interests, including in the balance whether the State law is outcome determinative
(if so, the scale tips toward the State, if not, the scale tips toward federal interests),
bearing in mind the twin aims of Erie: preventing forum shopping and promoting the
equitable administration of justice. 380 U.S. at 467-69.
The Convention on the International Sale of Goods is an example of the Supremacy Clause's
vertical preemption of State substantive law. With the Convention, the preempted State law will most
often be UCC Article 2.
106. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air ("Warsaw Convention"). opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929,49 STAT. 3000, 137 LN.T.S. 11. See,
e.g., id. at art. 29(2) (applying forum law to the calculation of the two-year limitations period set up
under article 29(1)).
107. Council Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. 1. 266) i (1980), signed in Rome on June 19, 1980 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter
"European Convention"], reprinted in ERIc STEIN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAWS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE. 467-75 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAWS"].
108. European Convention, supra note 106. art. 4.
109. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 106, at 198-99.
110. The Inter-American conventions were passed at four conferences, enacting nineteen
conventions and various protocols regarding choice of law for a number of matters (along with other
conflict of laws areas such as discovery. judgment enforcement, child abduction and other matters). See
Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law: Six Inter-American Conventions,
Jan. 30, 1975. 14 I.L.M. 325: Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law, May 8,1979,18 I.LM. 1211; Third Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law: Conventions and Additional Protocol. May 24. 1984, 24 IL.M. 459; Organization of American
States: Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law, July 15, 1989, 29
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Some or all of these rules may apply, depending on the type of
jurisdiction and culture. Although renvoi is popular in some jurisdictions,
do not use it unless forum law directs its use. In some countries (as well
as Kentucky and Michigan in tort cases).. the choice of law rule is lex
fori, that is, the forum applies its own law. In that situation, you might
want to argue the applicability of the following section (although interna-
tional law probably will not get around Kentucky's lexfori rule).
IX. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS
International law offers guidance on choice of law in the form of limits
placed on states' legislative jurisdiction (i.e., a state's power to regulate
conduct within and outside the state's territory). Known in international law
as "prescriptive jurisdiction," these limits are similar to the constitutional
choice of law limits imposed on State and federal forums in the United
States. In discussing these limits, we must first distinguish between public
and private international law.
"Private international law" is the term for conflict of laws in the United
Kingdom and most civil-law jurisdictions. It encompasses issues of judicial
jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. Thus defined, private international law is choice of law.
Because the term is synonymous with the topic this article has addressed
thus far, private international law offers nothing further except additional
choice of law theories to be studied on a forum-by-forum basis.
"Public international law," on the other hand, is the source for the
additional limits on choice of law. Formerly known as "the law of
nations," public international law is "the law of the international com-
munity of states." ' International law derives from the treaties and
1.LM. 62. Particularly on point are: Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Bills
of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Invoices, opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975. 14 I.L.M. 332; Inter-
American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975, 14
I.LM. 334, [a second] Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, opened for
signature May 8, 1975, 18 I.LM. 1220; Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning
Commercial Companies, opened for signature May 8, 1975, 18 I.LM. 1222; Inter-American Convention
on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, opened for signature May 8, 1975, 18 I.LM. 1231; Inter-
American Convention on Domicile of Natural Persons in Private International Law, opened for signature
May 8. 1975. 18 I.L.M. 1234. Inter-American Convention on General Rules of Private International Law.
opened for signature May 8. 1975, 18 I.LM. 1236; Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws
Concerning the Adoption of Minors, openedforsignature May 24, 1984,24 I.L.M. 460; Inter-American
Convention on Personality and Capacity of Juridical Persons in Private International Law, opened for
signature May 24. 1984. 24 I.L.M. 465; Inter-American Convention on Contracts for the International
Carriage of Goods by Road, opened for signature July 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 81.
111. See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967), Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320
N.W.2d 842 (Mi. 1982). and other cases discussed in Henna Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice
of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521, 579-81 (1983).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATION, supra note 13, § 16 (1986).
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customs that regulate the conduct of nation-states in their relations with each
other, and to some extent, in their relations with individuals, business
associations, and other entities. '1 3 Some have disputed its nature as "true
law" because it lacks a vertical authority and enforcement structure. But
to the extent the advocate needs additional arguments for choice of law,
public international law offers useful, though often unenforceable, rules
limiting states' choice of law. This Article will briefly describe those limits
in two settings, and conclude with special rules under United States law for
addressing certain transnational choice of law issues.
A. Choice of Law in a True International Forum
For the most part, there is no choice of law in a public international
forum. The primary forum for public international law is the International
Court of Justice at The Hague, Netherlands. It uses "forum law," that is,
public international law. However, public international law is sometimes
supplemented by "general principles of law." These are legal norms drawn
from nation-states' laws to fill in gaps in international law. When national
laws offer conflicting choices for a general principles of law issue, the
selection process is similar to Leflar's "better rule of law" process." 4
Other public international law forums include any judicial body
convened by the United Nations, regional human rights courts such as the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and special arbitral bodies such as
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
B. Public International Law on Choice of Law in Private Disputes
Public international law is, for the most part, the substantive law that
regulates nation-states' behavior for actions done in an official or govern-
mental capacity. But it also provides jurisdictional limits on nation-states'
courts both in civil and criminal disputes. This Article is directed only to
the choice of law limits on private civil disputes, that is, cases involving
nongovernmental parties, or governmental parties acting in a private or
commercial capacity.
1. Five Principles of Prescriptive (or Legislative) Jurisdiction
International law's limits on choice of law in private disputes are known
as "prescriptive jurisdiction," and are based on five principles of state
authority. These five principles apply both to civil and criminal cases,
113. Id.
114. See APPENDIX B.
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although some seem particularly suited to criminal cases. In any given case,
the state whose substantive law is selected by the forum to govern the rights
and liabilities of the parties must satisfy at least one (many will satisfy more
than one) of the following principles:
The Territorial Principle: A state has jurisdiction to prescribe law
as to: (a) conduct within its territory; and (b) the status of persons or
things within its territory.'
5
The Nationality Principle: A state has jurisdiction to prescribe law
as to conduct outside its territory relating to the activities, interests,
status, or relations of its nationals who are located outside as well as
within its territory.' 16  This principle is sometimes divided into two
principles: Nationality'17 for the direct regulation of the conduct of
nationals and passive personality'8 for the regulation of the conduct
of nonnationals who act against nationals, whether within or outside the
regulating state's territory.
The Effects (or Objective Territoriality) Principle: A state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law as to conduct outside the territory that has
or is intended to have effects within the territory." 9 That is, Spain
has jurisdiction over someone standing in France who fires a shot into
Spain and hits someone. The scope of Spain's jurisdiction is not only
to adjudicate the victim's claim, but under prescriptive jurisdiction, to
apply Spanish substantive law.
20
The National Security Principle: A state has jurisdiction to
prescribe law as to conduct outside its territory by persons not its
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 402(1) (a) & (b); see also,
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, I 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (applying territorial principle
as a matter of general principle).
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13. § 402(2).
117. For examples of jurisdiction over individual persons based on their status as United States
nationals, see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,443 (1932) and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280. 287 (1952). This base of prescriptive jurisdiction extends to corporate persons that are
incorporated in the forum. see, e.g., United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I
to 2 (1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 414, but is questionable when
applied to corporations merely owned by nationals of the forum, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 13 § 414(2).
118. Passive personality, the concept of applying forum law to the conduct of a party having no
contact with the forum, on the basis of that party's injury to a foriegn national outside the forum, is often
criticized but still viable in cenain instances. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 77 (1988); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13. § 402 cmt. g (noting that the principle is being increasingly
applied to organized terrorist attacks on a state's nationals and assassinations of a state's diplomatic
representatives or other officials).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 402(l)(c).
120. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993); Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976).
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limited class of other state interests. 2 1 This jurisdiction is inherently
for criminal prosecution, but not limited to criminal actions. Examples
of state security interests include counterfeiting of currency, stamps,
passports, and other acts undermining the state's security or economy.
The Universality Principle: A state has jurisdiction to define
offenses and prescribe punishment for certain offenses of universal
concem such as piracy, slave trade, hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
crimes, and perhaps other terroristic acts, even though none of the other
principles of jurisdiction (territoriality, nationality, effects, national
security) is present.
2
Note that the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations also has specific
provisions limiting prescriptive jurisdiction over tax, securities, and antitrust
cases. 123
2. Reasonableness
All of the foregoing principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, except for
universality, are further governed by a principle of reasonableness. As
stated in Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations section 403, reasonableness
is determined by the links to the state whose law is to be applied, looking
to factors such as where the conduct occurred, who was involved, other
states' interests, and additional factors listed in section 403.124 Note that
section 403's reasonableness standard resembles the due process and full
faith and credit limits on legislative jurisdiction in the United States
Constitution.
Thus, if the forum's choice of law rule points to a state with an
unfavorable law (most often its own law), and the forum lacks due process-
type safeguards, 2 ' you may argue that international law prohibits the
application of any state's law that (1) fails to satisfy one of the five
principles and (2) is unreasonable under the standards in section 403.
The need for section 403's reasonableness standard should occur only
outside the United States, in states that lack due process safeguards. This
is not to suggest that our own States will never make an unreasonable
choice of law. 126 But when they do, due process provides as strong an
argument as section 403. Nonetheless, section 403 may be asserted in State
and federal courts. Federal courts must adhere to international law as a
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 402(3).
122. Id. § 404. see Filirtiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, §§ 411-16.
124. Id. § 403.
125. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g.. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).
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matter of federal common law;127 State courts must do so under the
Supremacy Clause. 2 "
3. Remedies for Noncompliance
a. Political
As discussed above, international law's limits on the forum's choice of
law are arguments of last resort. In an unfriendly forum, these arguments
may not work. If the forum disregards these principles by applying a law
that lacks a reasonable relation to the dispute, the only immediate remedy
is political, by either: (1) seeking your government's diplomatic interven-
tion to protest the unfair litigation (unlikely); or (2) requesting that your
government bring an action in your interest in the International Court of
Justice (also unlikely).
b. Blocking Enforcement of the Judgment in Other Forums
Another remedy, perhaps the only realistic one, is blocking the
enforcement of the unfriendly forum's judgment in other states. Public
international law provides that absent a treaty, foreign judgments are
enforced under the weak, nonbinding doctrine of comity. Comity is more
political goodwill than a rule of law, but nonetheless provides for nonen-
forcement of a questionable judgment on the basis of public policy.
129
Thus, you may be able to persuade the enforcing forum to disregard another
forum's judgment on the grounds that an unreasonable choice of law
violates the enforcing forum's public policy.
In the United States, foreign judgment enforcement is a question of State
law in both State and federal courts. 30 International law's comity stan-
dards are still sometimes applied, but only as a matter of forum law. Texas
and many other States use the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recogni-
tion Act ("UFMJRA"). '3 The UFMJRA has no express defense to
enforcement based on a suspect choice of law by the first forum. It does,
however, provide for nonrecognition if "the judgment was rendered under
a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compati-
127. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900).
128. Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 619-20 (Cal. 1952); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 131.
129. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 16, at 11-15 (2d ed. 1992).
130. See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (5th
Cir. 1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 481 cmnt. a.
131. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENT RECOGNITION ACT §§ 1-11, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1962)




ble with the requirements of due process of law.'1 32  Although no
UFMJRA cases have addressed a choice of law challenge, it is clear that due
process requires a reasonable connection between the dispute and the state
whose law is applied to that dispute. 33 The UFMJRA also provides a
public policy defense to enforcement,'3 which could arguably be asserted
against an unreasonable choice of law. Readers should note that the
UFMJRA applies to foreign country judgments only, and is not the uniform
act for recognition of judgments from other States in the United States.
35
According to the two European conventions on the enforcement of
foreign judgments, the judgment forum ("F-I") choice of law may be
objected to in the enforcing forum ("F-2"), but only as to preliminary
choice of law questions relating to capacity, marital status and inheri-
tance. 136 Of course, the judgment may also be challenged on grounds of
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, finality, and preclusion (res
judicata), under the UFMJRA and the European conventions.
Of course, preclusion (res judicata) will operate in favor of the F-1
judgment creditor. The F-1 creditor may choose to bypass the UFMJRA
and instead file a new, lawsuit in F-2, and use the F-1 judgment as a basis
for summary judgment in F-2. If this happens, and if the defendant fully
defended in F-i, the defendant may have to show fraud or fundamental
unfairness in the F-1 judgment to defeat its preclusive effect in F-2.
C. Specific United States Choice of Law Rules for Certain Transnational
Issues
1. Treaties and Conventions
Where the United States is concerned, treaties and conventions tend to
be more substantive than procedural,'37 and therefore do not involve
132. UFMJRA. supra note 130, § 4(a)(l).
133. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
134. UFMJRA, supra note 130, § 4(b)(3).
135. See id. § 1.
136. See European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, ar. 27.4, O.J. L304177 (Oct. 30, 1978), 8 I.L.M. 229, 236
(entered into force Feb. 1, 1973) [hereinafter "the Brussels Convention"]; European Communi-
ties-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, art. 27.4. O.J. (L 319) 9. 28 I.L.M. 620, 629 (not yet
ratified) [hereinafter the "Lugano Convention"]. Note that the two conventions govern different free
trade areas: the Brussels Convention governs the ECC states (the Common Market), while the Lugano
Convention governs the EFTA states (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). The
Lugano Convention closely follows its Brussels counterpart, and together, the two will eventually provide
the same rules for 18 European states. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 420-56 (1993) (discussing the recognition of foreign judgments in
Europe).
137. The United States has been reluctant to sign treaties and conventions in many areas,
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choice of law rules. However, the United States has specific choice of law
rules in a few treaties and conventions, such as the Warsaw Convention. 3 '
To the extent that State court choice of law rules are contrary to the treaty,
the treaty controls under the Supremacy Clause. Because State choice of
law rules do not apply to actions arising under federal law, and treaties are
federal law even when applied to private transactions, collisions between
State and treaty choice of law rules should be rare. 39
2. Act of State Doctrine
The United States has a choice of law rule - the Act of State Doctrine
- for certain cases involving disputes arising from or involving foreign
governmental action. The foremost precedent is Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,t40 an action for compensation resulting from Castro's
nationalization of private property. The United States Supreme Court used
Sabbatino to restate the precedent that courts in the United States cannot
review the legality of a foreign government action.'
4'
Congress immediately acted to limit Sabbatino's effect in nationalization
cases with the Second Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act.'42 It provides that courts may not apply the Act of State Doctrine as
stated in Sabbatino to any taking that violates international law. 3 The
law specifically excludes, however: (1) acts of state not in violation of
international law; (2) claims of title or right to irrevocable letters of credit
of not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the
confiscation; and (3) any case where the President has determined that the
Act of State Doctrine is necessary to United States foreign policy inter-
ests.144
Courts have held that the Hickenlooper Amendment applies to
confiscated property before the court, but it does not apply to property not
before the court. 1
5
Because the Hickenlooper Amendment applies only to confiscation
cases, the Act of State Doctrine has full effect in nontaking cases, such as
including those providing remedies involving foreign courts, or the application of foreign law.
138. See supra note 105.
139. U.S. CONST. art. II1: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
140. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
141. Id. at 428.
142. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988); see generally RESTATEMENT (TmfRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 13, § 444 crots. a. b. c. e, and reporters' note 4 (discussing adoption of the Second
Hickenlooper Amendment).
143. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c).
144. Id.




Underhill v. Hernandez," a case involving damages for assault and false
arrest by a foreign military commander. 47
The Act of State Doctrine may appear to be a sovereign immunity rule,
but leading commentators label it a choice of law rule.148  As such, the
rule is that parties' rights in a dispute involving foreign governmental action
will be determined by the law of the state committing the act, provided that
the act occurred within the territory of the foreign government.
49
Note that the Act of State Doctrine is United States domestic law-it is
not international law. Thus, courts in foreign countries are not bound by the
Doctrine, and may adjudicate the legality of a United States governmental
act unless constrained by political interests or a different sovereign immunity
rule. 50  Although not a rule of international law, the Doctrine is applied
in similar forms by English courts and a few other jurisdictions.'
5'
X. CONCLUSION
For Texas state and federal practice, this Article will spot most choice
of law issues and suggest solutions to many. For forums outside of Texas,
this Article attempts no answers but does offer a formula approach to
ascertaining that forum's perspective on choice of law. Readers should note,
however, that this is no more than a starting point for research on any
particular choice of law problem.
146. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
147. For other nontaking cases, see RESTATEMENT (HIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13,
§ 444 cmt. c and reporters' notes 3, 7.
148. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 223-24 (1972). Sabbatino
also held that the Act of State Doctrine was not compelled by the Constitution, but that it had
"constitutional underpinnings" in the Separation of Powers Clause (restricting the judicial branch from
interfering with the executive's interests in foreign affairs). Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
149. 376 U.S. at 416.
150. Id. at 421.
151. See IAN BROWNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 507-08 (4th ed. 1990)
(noting the recent reluctance of English courts to apply the Doctrine in confiscation cases).
1994]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
XL. APPENDIX A: SELECTED CHOICE OF LAW STATUTES
Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) provides that "[a] court, subject
to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state
on choice of law." Restatement (Second) section 6(2) applies only where
there is no specific statutory directive. The following are specific statutory
choice of law rules in Texas:
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1994). This statute honors the parties' choice of law in a UCC-
governed contract, subject to the exceptions in § 1.105(b) below.
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1994). This section provides that the parties' choice of law in
section 1.105(a) does not override the contrary provisions in sections
2.402, 4.102, 8.106, and 9.103, which are also choice of law statutes.
Section 1.105(b) also provides that the law indicated by those subse-
quent UCC choice of law rules will include the "whole law" of the
referent state, including its choice of law rule (i.e., § 1.105(b) calls for
renvoi).
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.402(b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). At the creditor's option, the [whole] law of the
state where the goods are situated applies to certain issues involving
creditors' rights against sold goods.
4. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.509(a) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). The law (substantive law only) of the place of
dishonor governs the authority of the person to certify a payee's
protest of a commercial paper's dishonor.
5. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.102(b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). The [whole] law of the place where the bank is
located applies to issues involving bank liability for action or non-
action regarding presentment, payment, or collection.
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.102 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968) (repealed). The forum's [whole] law applies to cases
involving bulk transfers of goods located in Texas. This statute was
repealed effective September 1, 1993. Act of June 11, 1993, 73rd
Leg., R.S., ch. 570, § 16, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2147 (Vernon).
7. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.106 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991). The whole law of "the jurisdiction of organization
of the issuer" applies in cases involving the validity, effectiveness
of registration, and issuer's rights and duties regarding investment
securities.
8. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991). The [whole] law of various designated jurisdictions
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applies in cases involving the perfection of security interests in
multi-state transactions.
"Whole law" in the above UCC sections means the substantive law
plus the choice of law rule of that state (i.e., renvoi). Where
"whole" is bracketed, it is unexpressed in that section but imposed
by section 1.105(b). In section 8.106, where "whole" is not
bracketed, it is express in the statute.
9. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 33.09 (Vernon 1987).
Section 33.09 provides that the rights and duties of a corporation
and its transfer agents in registering a security or in making a
transfer of a security pursuant to a fiduciary's assignment are
governed by the law of the jurisdiction under whose laws the
corporation is organized, and providing further that for the purposes
of this Act, a National Banking Association is deemed to have been
organized in the State in which its principal banking house is
located.
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon Supp.
1994). Enacted by the Texas legislature in 1993, this section
provides that parties to a "qualified transaction" may designate as
governing law (both as to validity and enforceability) the law of any
jurisdiction (presumably a State or foreign country) that bears a
reasonable relationship to the transaction, even if the chosen law is
contrary to Texas public policy. In certain instances the parties may
choose the law of a jurisdiction that does not bear a reasonable
relation to the transaction. Id. § 35.51. The statute defines
"transaction" and "qualified transaction," lists five alternatives that
create a reasonable relation between the transaction and the chosen
jurisdiction, is expressly subordinated to other specific choice of law
statutes under Texas and federal law, and has other provisions that
will significantly affect the drafting of choice of law clauses in
Texas. Id.
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.52 (Vernon Supp.
1994). Also enacted in 1993, this section is substantially similar to
the former section 35.53(c) and provides that certain defined
construction contracts for the construction or repair of improvements
to real property located in Texas which have a choice of law clause
designating the law of another state are voidable, as to the choice
of law clause, by the party that is obligated to perform.
12. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.53 (Vernon Supp.
1994). This section requires that a limited class of contracts with
choice of law clauses choosing the law of another state must
designate those clauses "conspicuously in print, type, or other form
of writing that is bold-faced, capitalized, underlined, or otherwise
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set out in such a manner that a reasonable person against whom the
provision may operate would notice." Id. § 35.53(b). This is not
a true choice of law statute in that it does not designate the law
applicable to a specific claim or transaction. It does, however,
affect the validity of a limited group of contractual choice of law
clauses. Although this Article does not discuss forum selection
clauses, readers should note that section 35.53(b) requires the same
notice for contractual clauses designating the site of litigation or
arbitration.
It is interesting to note that section 35.51 refers to parties choosing
the law of another "jurisdiction," while section 35.53 applies to
parties choosing the law of another "state." The author assumes
that both "jurisdiction" and "state" refer to any State or territory
in the United States as well as any foreign country.
13. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. art. 8.02 (Vernon Supp. 1994), providing
that a foreign corporation will have the same but no greater rights,
privileges and liabilities as a domestic corporation, except as to (1)
internal affairs, and (2) piercing the veil, .both of which are governed by
the law of the state of incorporation.
14. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.066 (Vernon
1986). A Texas action on a foreign judgment is barred if the action
would be barred under the laws of the rendering jurisdiction.
15. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.067 (Vernon
1986). A person may not bring a claim against a person who has
moved to Texas if the claim is barred by the statute of limitations
of the State or foreign country from which the person came.
The two preceding statutes are examples of "borrowing statutes,"
that is, Texas limitations statutes that borrow the limitations rule of
another state. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 58-66 (3d ed. 1986).
16. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.003, 71.031
(Vernon 1986). These sections provide for choice of law in
wrongful death actions involving acts or deaths outside of Texas.
17. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981). Texas law
governs certain local insurance contracts notwithstanding the
contract's designation of execution or performance in another state.
18. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.43(e), § 7(c) (Vernon Supp.
1994). A foreign casualty insurer does not have to make the deposit
required by Texas law if the insurer has made a similar deposit in
any other State, under that State's law, and in a manner that secures




19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.71, 21.07 (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1994). This section provides for choice of law in enforce-
ment of foreign child support decrees.
20. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 9.03 (Vernon
1964). Any contract made by any foreign savings and loan
association with any Texas citizen shall be deemed a Texas contract
and construed under Texas law.
21. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 361.028 (Vernon 1988).
This statute provides for the applicable law in various situations in
the joint two-state operation of justice centers in border counties.
In particular, the section provides that if i t is impossible for a
person to conform his or her conduct in the justice center to the
laws of both states, that person may choose which state's law
governs that conduct.
22. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.14 to 3.16 (Vernon
Supp. 1994). This statute provides for choice of law in workers
compensation actions for injuries outside of Texas.
To the extent these Texas statutory choice of law rules are inade-
quate in certain cases, they should be supplemented with the Texas
general choice of law rule, the most significant relationship test.
Federal law also has specific choice of law statutes, including:
23. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988). This statute provides for choice of
law for rates of interest charged by federally regulated banking
associations. The choice of law provisions are both vertical (Erie
or federal/state choice of law) and horizontal (state vs. state,
including foreign countries).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). This section provides for
choice of law and renvoi in claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The Supreme Court imposed renvoi by statutory construction
in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). This is the change of venue
statute applicable to federal district courts. The choice of law rule
of the transferor court applies to actions transferred pursuant to §
1404. In diversity cases, it is the choice of law rule from the state
in which the transferor court is located. Ferens v. John Deere Co.,
494 U.S. 516 (1990). Federal question cases seldom have choice of
law questions, because federal substantive law is presumably
uniform. Transfers pursuant to § 1404 do create choice of law
questions where the action is transferred to a federal circuit with a
different interpretation of federal law. The applicable law in such
cases is that of the circuit of the transferor court. Eckstein v. Balcor
Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993). Contra Menowitz
v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993).
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26. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1988). The section provides for choice of
law in injury claims under the Federal Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 17(b). This rule provides that a party's
capacity is to be determined by the law of that party's domicile.
CHOICE OF LAW
XII. APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
Act of State Doctrine: A rule of United States domestic law that State
and federal courts will not review the governmental actions of a foreign
sovereign performed in that sovereign's territory. This is applied most often
to nationalization cases and is statutorily modified by the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988).
Better Rule of Law: Robert Leflar's proposal for basing choice of law
on the more progressive of two or more applicable rules. See ROBERT A.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 12, 212-19 (3d ed. 1977).
Characterization: The process of labeling, defining, or categorizing the
facts or legal concepts in a lawsuit. Three types of characterization are
claim, issue, and substance/procedure.
Choice of Law Rules: Always determined initially by forum law, the
pertinent choice of law rules in any case may be of two types: the general
common law rules (such as "lex locus delicti" in the older system, or the
most significant relationship test now used in Texas), and statutory rules,
which tend to be specific as to particular substantive laws.
Constitutional Choice of Law: The Supreme Court's term for the limits
placed on choice of law by the United States Constitution.
Dgpegage: Splitting multiple claims in a lawsuit, or multiple issues in
a claim, and applying different states' laws.
False Conflict: When the laws of two or more states are the same, or
produce the same result (majority definition); or, when only one state has
a true interest in the case (Currie's definition in his "governmental interest
analysis" method for choice of law). See infra "Governmental Interest
Analysis."
Governmental Interest Analysis: Professor Brainerd Currie's choice of
law method, focussing on the weighing of competing state's interests in the
dispute. See infra "State Interest."
Klaxon Doctrine: The federal common law rule directing the use of the
choice of law rules of the state in which the federal court sits. See Klaxon
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
Law:
Local Law: The substantive law of a state.
Whole Law: The substantive law plus the choice of law rules of a
state.
Foreign Law: Any law outside the forum. Thus in Texas, all laws
except those of Texas and the United States are foreign.
Legislative Jurisdiction: The due process limitations on the application
of any state's law, requiring a reasonable connection between the dispute
and the law applied. Public international law provides similar limitations.
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Most Significant Relationship Test: Narrowly defined, the seven factor
choice of law test set forth at Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
section 6. Broadly defined, section 6 and all related choice of law rules in
the Restatement (Second).
Private International Law: The term for "choice of law" used by civil-
law states from the Napoleonic Code tradition.
Public Policy: A strongly held state interest and one factor directing
choice of law. The public policies of the forum and all interested states
should be considered as part of the full faith and credit choice of law
analysis and in any modem choice of law theory, such as the most
significant relationship test or government interest analysis.
Renvoi: The practice of looking to the chosen state's "whole law"
(including its choice of law rule), thus letting the chosen state's (rather than
the forum's) choice of law rule control. However, renvoi should not be
used unless the forum's choice of law rules direct its use.
State: A territorial unit with a distinct general body of law. Thus
"state" may refer to Texas or Ontario, as distinct state members of larger
federal unions, or to the United States or Canada. "State" may not be used
for Dallas, which has no general body of law, or to Europe, which also lacks
(at this point) any general body of law. Some cities, such as the Vatican
and Monaco, are states. Moreover, Europe may acquire state status
eventually (although the European state may not be synonymous with
continental Europe).
State Interest: A choice of law factor in the most significant relation-
ship test (and in certain other choice of law tests), assessing the relative
interests of affected states, as expressed in statutes, cases, legislative history,
and other sources. Public policy is one example of state interest, but the
state's interest need not rise to the level of public policy to be an "interest"
for choice of law purposes. Moreover, a state interest may be expressed in
the absence of a law or policy as well as in its presence, if the absence was
the result of legislative or judicial intent.
872 [Vol. 25:833
